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The secularization debate involves a lengthy time horizon and competing 
predictions over mankind’s cultural future (Swatos and Olson 2000). Each party 
possesses its cherished ‘master narratives’: taken-for-granted outlooks regarding where 
we have come from and where we are going, which can structure interpretations of data 
(Taylor 2007: 427-8; 2009). In addition, the immense complexity of the terms ‘religion’ 
and ‘secularization’ and their symbiotic historical and etymological relationship 
problematize the issue (Casanova 1994). Notwithstanding these difficulties, at the most 
basic level, there exist competing visions concerning the relative trajectory of distinct 
‘secular’ and ‘religious’ populations. With so much at stake, it is surprising that two 
major aspects of religious change in Europe have generally been overlooked: first, shifts 
in the rate (rather than merely the direction) of religious change; second, the population 
dynamics of religious change, i.e. demography. Demography is especially important for 
narratives of change, because it is the most predictable of the social sciences. One can use 
population age and sex structures, as well as migration patterns and fertility and mortality 
trends to make reasonable predictions about the future religious character of a population. 
If we assume that people’s current religious preferences are unrelated to their previous 
views or those of their parents, and that people change their religiosity as they might a 
pair of clothes, then we may safely disregard demographic analysis. However, given that 
this is manifestly not the case, demographic approaches to the study of religion’s rise or 
decline are essential. Moreover, demographic projections of religious composition 
become feasible - not as definitive predictions, but to reveal how the macro trend of 
religious growth or decline is affected by demographic factors and current switching 
patterns. In this paper, we use cohort component projections of Austria, Switzerland and 
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Spain to help inform the empirical picture deployed by secularization theorists and their 
adversaries.  
Trends in religious conversion and apostasy in the ‘native’ European-origin 
population vary markedly between countries in Europe, and these social changes lie 
behind most of the variation in rates of religious decline between European countries 
(Greely 2002; Davie 1994; Halman and Draulans 2006). This study builds upon these 
observations, adding that rates of change can shift over time within societies as well as 
between them. In particular, it finds that rates of socially-driven religious decline seem to 
be most rapid when societies first undergo ‘secularization’ (in Steve Bruce’s 2002 
formulation) but tend to taper off in subsequent periods.  
This paper also adds a demographic dimension, which it argues will become 
progressively more consequential for the European religious panorama in the twenty-first 
century. Demography is shaped by cultural and economic forces, but once 'birthed', 
population dynamics acquire a causal power which can reshape the social. The most 
important of these new demographic factors are religious fertility and religious 
immigration.
1
 First of all, the growing importance of values in determining family size 
(Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004)  means that religious native-stock European women have 
significantly higher fertility than their ‘secular’ counterparts. Second, current patterns of 
immigration, coupled with differences in age structure and fertility between those of 
European and non-European descent as well as lower losses through conversion to other 
religions and secularism, are radically reshaping the region. Already, non-Europeans 
have changed the face of western Europe, especially the cities. Their numbers will triple 
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by 2050, and, towards the end of our century, those of unmixed European ancestry may 
be in the minority (Coleman and Scherbov 2005; Coleman 2006, 2009,  2010).  
Importantly, these non-European immigrants tend to be more religious – typically 
Muslims or Christians - than their host populations (Phalet 2010). The limited evidence 
for second generation minority populations suggests that religious decline will occur 
more slowly (if at all) among them than it has among the majority population. In short, 
scholars can no longer juxtapose the religious exceptionalism of minorities with the 
secular European mainstream when minorities become mainstream. These interlocking 
trends – decelerating rates of net exit from religion, religious immigration and religious 
fertility – may signal a modest rebound of religion in western Europe by the mid-twenty 
first century.  
 
The Secularization Debate 
 
 The term secularization is a contested concept, first used by Christian 
commentators in their discussion of secular time, which some suggest is reflective of a 
peculiar pattern of western theological modernization (Casanova 1994). Others aver that 
the term is a useful descriptor of reality and possesses two dimensions, one public (i.e. 
institutional relations between religion and the state) and one private (i.e. personal piety, 
whether in the form of beliefs, practice or affiliation). This study is concerned with the 
latter, but rather than enter into the wider debate over secularization, this paper narrows 
its focus to the less loaded question of religious decline. Consider, for example, the  
European trend of growing post-Christian, individualized spirituality among the young 
and well-educated. These individuals reject spiritual authority and conventional religious 
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categories (including ‘god’) but also spurn rationalistic atheism and embrace an 
immanent form of belief (Houtman and Aupers 2007; Taylor 2007: 507-16). For us, this 
represents religious decline, but its relationship to secularization remains ambiguous. 
On both sides of the debate, there is wide agreement that religiosity can rise and 
fall over time. Secularization theorists claim that human development, social 
differentiation, expressive individualism and cultural relativism lead to religious decline 
in modern societies (Bell 1996 [1976]; Dobbelaere 2000; Bellah [1985] 1996). Revivals 
are driven by human insecurity or ‘secular’ movements like ethno-nationalism and 
regionalism which use religious symbols and institutions to mobilize people (Bruce 2002; 
Martin [1978] 1993). Advocates of the supply-side perspective maintain that religious 
decline is a feature of societies with a poorly developed religious marketplace. In 
particular, those with an established religion tend to spawn a lax religious establishment 
which fails to cater to the wide spectrum of religious demand latent in a population. 
Revivals are linked to new religious innovators who tap unmet spiritual demands (Stark 
and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000: 57-79).  
While both secularization and religious markets theorists agree that religious 
decline is possible, religious trends have theoretical implications because secularization 
theorists posit a link between modernizing processes and religious decline while religious 
markets theorists declare them largely independent. So religious decline over time tends 
to be taken as confirmation of the secularization paradigm (and a rise as evidence for 
religious markets) even if the theories cannot be strictly judged on this evidence. Thus 
even the ‘facts’ (i.e. data) of religious decline or revival tend to be fiercely contested. For 
western Europe, some analyses of survey data find a consistent pattern of religious 
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decline encompassing participation (attendance), belief and affiliation (Voas and Crockett 
2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004, ch. 3). Others discern variation between countries on 
these measures, with trajectories turning on whether the variable of interest is religious 
practice, belief, traditionalism or affiliation. Andrew Greeley, using data from the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) religion modules contends that the 
religious situation in Europe defies any unitary process like religious decline (Greeley 
2002).  
Grace Davie, drawing on the recent European Values Survey (EVS), finds diverse 
religious pathways, but also a regularity of 'believing without belonging' in many 
European countries. She even avers that the data often show religious belief varying 
inversely with religious practice (Davie 1994, 2002: 4-8). This work builds on these 
nuanced studies of religious trends in western Europe by highlighting variations in 
attendance and belief both between and within particular countries. However, this paper 
remains agnostic as to whether these patterns are best explained by secularization or 
religious markets perspectives. 
 
Demographic Aspects of Religion 
 
 Much of the research on the sociology of religion has focused on religion as a 
social phenomenon whose rise or decline depends upon the conscious choices of 
individuals within changing structural contexts. However, it is apparent that even in the 
absence of socially-inspired revivals/declines of religion, the degree of religiosity in a 
society can fluctuate. The chief non-social mechanism of change is demography. If we 
consider 'the religious' as a population affected not only by assimilation/dissimilation into 
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the secular population but by migration, fertility and mortality, we arrive at a more 
multivalent picture. David Voas is one sociologist who has urged that greater attention be 
paid to the use of demographic methods in the study of religion. 'People enter, exit, and 
move within religion,' he remarks, 'just as they are born, will die, and migrate, in life' 
(Voas 2003: 94). For Michael Hout, 'demography helps shape the religious landscape… 
The combination of differing demography and stable intergenerational religious 
socialization would be sufficient to equalize or even reverse the relative sizes of the 
religions.' (Hout 2003: 79-80). 
 'Silent' demographic effects can be profound in the long-term. For example, 
Rodney Stark shows how early Christians' favourable fertility and mortality rates as 
compared to Hellenistic pagans helped fuel a 40 percent growth rate in the Christian 
population of the Roman Empire over several centuries. This gave rise to a population 
increase from 40 converts in 30 A.D. to 6 million by the year 300 leading to a 'tipping 
point' which helped Christianity become institutionalized within the Empire (Stark 1996). 
Currently, many Islamic parts of what was once the Roman Empire have seen major 
declines in their Christian and Jewish populations due to emigration, lower fertility and 
mixed marriages (Fargues 2001) 
 Those who study the religious marketplace in the United States have been 
impressed by the extent to which denominations have grown through migration and 
fertility advantage. Sherkat (2001), for example, finds that American Catholics have been 
able to offset large net losses to other denominations and secularization through gains 
arising from (largely) Hispanic-Catholic immigrants and their higher fertility. Fertility 
differentials can also play a key role - especially in the long term. Mormons, once a very 
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small sect, now equal or surpass Jews among post-1945 birth cohorts due to their fertility 
advantage over Jews and other denominations (Sherkat 2001: 1472-4). Conservative 
Protestants, a much larger group than the Mormons, also benefit from relatively high 
fertility. Hout, Greeley and Wilde (2001) find that three-quarters of the growth of 
conservative Protestant denominations against their liberal counterparts is due to fertility 
advantage rather than conversion. 
 In Europe, there has been less attention paid to fertility differences between 
denominations. However, several studies have discovered that immigrants to Europe tend 
to be more religious than the host population and - especially if Muslim - tend to retain 
their religiosity (van Tubergen 2006). Though some indicators point to modest religious 
decline toward the host society mean, other trends suggest that immigrants become more, 
rather than less, religious the longer they reside in the host society (van Tubergen 2007). 
All of which indicates that  religious decline may fail at the aggregate level even if it is 
occurring at the individual level (Kaufmann 2006; 2010). This article thereby investigates 
the hypothesis that a combination of higher religious fertility, immigration and slowing 
rates of religious apostasy will eventually produce a reversal in the decline of the 
religious population of western Europe. 
  
Data and Methods 
 
 In order to test this hypothesis, this paper draws upon data from several sources. 
These include the EVS of 1981, 1990, 1999-2000, 2008 and the second wave European 
Social Survey (ESS) of 2004. We use these datasets because of their combined historical 
time-span (30 years) and the fact that they ask the same (or similar) questions on 
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religiosity and fertility. This study also draws upon three surveys of ethnic minorities in 
the United Kingdom to examine Muslim religious dynamics (Berthoud et. al 1997; Home 
Office 2003; Office for National Statistics and Home Office 2005), and complements this 
with Austrian, Swiss and British census data.  These are the only west European countries 
(bar Ireland) to ask a religion question on their census. 
The study is limited to ten west European countries, with roughly 1000 cases per 
country in a given year. Countries included are Spain, Belgium, Ireland, France, the 
Netherlands, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Sweden. These countries were 
selected because they are the only cases that were sampled across all waves of the EVS 
and ESS on the research questions of interest. This therefore maximizes the number of 
countries and cases within the constraint of repeated measures over time.
2
 Rather than 
weighting each country sample by its population, they have been aggregated in additive 
fashion to prevent larger countries skewing the results.  
Though these countries only represent a sample of European nations, we believe 
they broadly represent 'western European' (i.e. all but eastern Europe) trends. To situate 
the dataset in a European context, one can examine the same ten countries using data 
from the World Christian Database (WCD), aggregate them the same way, and see how 
their combined degree of nonreligiosity - this time measured in terms of no religious 
affiliation - compares with Europe as a whole.
3
 The comparison is not perfect, of course, 
since our terms of reference are not identical. The WCD works with aggregated baptismal 
data, which gives a good measure of affiliation, while we are more interested in 
attendance and subjective measures of religious belief, which come from the EVS, ESS 
and minority surveys.
4
 That said, the comparison with WCD agnosticism data in figure 1 
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does help reassure us that this sample, labeled ‘10 dataset’ in figure 1, is not exceptional 
within western Europe. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Source: World Christian Database 2008. Note: data not available for identical time 
intervals. 
 
Evidently the sample used in this analysis, which blends cases fairly evenly from the 
WCD regions of northern, western and southern Europe, is well within the bounds of the 
four regional European trends, though lying closest to the northern European pattern. 
  
Results 
 
 Has religious decline occurred in these ten countries? Most contemporary 
analyses examine aggregate trends over time or inter-cohort trends at one point in time 
(i.e. Norris and Inglehart 2004; Voas 2009).
5
  Here we utilise the EVS time-series of 
nearly thirty years to provide an age-period-cohort (APC) analysis to distinguish life 
cycle, period and cohort trends. The standard WVS/EVS question on religious attendance 
for 1981, 1990, 2000 and 2008 asks 'Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, 
about how often do you attend religious services these days?' The EVS allows for a 
seven-category response to this question. This was transformed into a dummy (0 or 1) 
variable for tabulation purposes, coded to distinguish between those who attended weekly 
or more (1) and the rest, i.e. those who attended monthly or less (0). The ESS 2004 
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adopted the exact same question, so coding strategy is identical. The results are presented 
in figure 2 for ten-year cohorts, with the percentage of weekly attenders along the Y-axis 
and ten-year birth cohorts along the X-axis. Lines represent different survey wave years. 
Notice that there is a pronounced pattern of declining religious attendance as we move 
from left to right, from the earliest to the most recent birth cohorts.
6
  
 In addition, attendance is declining with each survey so the most recent lines are 
below the older ones, apart from a jump in the 2000 EVS which may be a period effect. 
Also evident is the lack of any life-cycle pattern whereby respondents return to worship 
as they get older: the five wave lines do not shift upwards in chronological order with 
1981 at the bottom and 2008 at the top. This appears to confirm the findings of 
secularization theory, which argues that religious attendance falls across generations and 
does not revive as one ages through the life course.  
  
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Source: EVS 1981, 1990, 1999-2000, 2008 and ESS 2004 
* Data for 2000 uses Norway responses from 1997 
** Data for 2004 from ESS which uses same question but different survey methodology 
 
To get at Davie's 'believing without belonging' argument, one must probe private 
religious belief. The EVS asks: 'Independently of whether you go to church or not, would 
you say you are: 1-a religious person, 2-not a religious person, 3-an atheist'.
7
 Looking at 
the proportion of self-identified 'religious' people by cohort in figure 3, We find that 
individual religiosity, like attendance, has declined steadily within these societies across 
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birth cohorts, with those born more recently, ie. 1985-94, much less religious than those 
born earlier, i.e. 1935-44. The same cannot be said for spirituality: the EVS question, 
'How spiritual are you?' reveals that in 2008, approximately half of those across all age 
cohorts count themselves as 'somewhat' or 'very' interested. Moreover, recent findings 
from the ISSP 2008 show that the belief in life after death is higher among younger than 
older age groups, while belief in god shows the reverse pattern. This has led Voas to 
remark that the 'afterlife has replaced God' among European youth (Voas 2010). In 
essence, the EVS religion question, which exhibits inter-cohort decline, does not seem to 
be tapping a generalized spirituality. 
Is this proof of west European religious decline? Yes and no. True, the trend is 
toward decline across generations. Yet there are some interesting divergences from the 
attendance patterns in figure 2. First, the data on self-assessed religiosity support the life 
cycle hypothesis that individuals become more religious as they age. This is an 
interesting departure from the secularization position, and contrasts with the pattern we 
noted for attendance. The lines generally shift upward across all cohorts with each survey 
wave, though there was a significant increase over 1990-2000 and a decrease between 
2000 and 2008 (this seems to be a 2000 period effect). For example, among those born 
during 1955-64, the proportion describing themselves as religious rose from 42.5 percent 
in 1981 (when they were aged 16-26) to 54.9 percent three decades later when they 
reached their 40s and 50s. This religious intensity pattern contrasts with the findings of 
some who, for the British case, find no evidence of the return of the aged to religious 
affiliation (Tilley 2003; Crockett and Voas 2006).  
 
 [Figure 3 here] 
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Source: EVS 1981, 1990, 1999-2000 and ESS 2004 
* Data for 2000 uses Norway responses from 1997 
** Data for 2004 from ESS which uses different question and different methodology 
 
 Within the ten country dataset, one can distinguish cases where religious decline 
took place relatively early (France plus Nordic countries and Britain) from those where it 
has taken hold more recently (three Catholic countries plus half-Catholic Holland). Why 
do this? Because one would expect, from religious markets logic, that certain religious 
consumers gain more utility from their religiosity than others for the same ‘price’, i.e. 
they place different values (reserve prices) on their faith despite paying the same market 
price. When religious norms give way to secular ones, the costs of leaving religion fall 
and the price of remaining rises (viz. shifting individual budget constraints and utility 
functions), such that those who leave are likely to be individuals who do not value their 
religious goods as highly. People begin to exit until marginal utility equals marginal cost. 
As increasing numbers leave, reserve prices approach market prices and the marginal 
propensity to leave falls.  
 Thus we would expect the rate of decline to be lower in societies that have 
experienced earlier falls in individual piety. In other words, there is an exhaustion effect 
in which religious decline loses momentum as it encounters progressively higher 
marginal resistance among the remnant who remain religious. The data, presented in 
figure 4, show that the percentage of weekly church attenders in the ‘early-declining’ (i.e. 
mainly Protestant) societies is effectively flat for those born after 1945. By contrast, in 
the late-declining (mainly Catholic) societies, postwar cohorts born more recently, i.e. 
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1985-94, are much less likely to attend than those born earlier, i.e. 1945-55. The decline 
in church attendance across all cohorts is roughly 10-20 percent in the early-declining 
countries, but 30-50 percent in the late-declining ones.
8
 David Voas, who has examined a 
wider range of European countries (albeit at just one point in time) using 2007 ESS and 
2008 ISSP data similarly confirms that 'in the most secular countries...the curve [of 
decline] appears to flatten out in the last couple of decades (Voas 2009; 2010).' 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
Source: EVS 1981, 1990, 1999-2000, 2008 and ESS 2004 
* Data for 2000 uses Norway responses from 1997 
** Data for 2004 from ESS which uses same question but different methodology 
 
The picture is different for private religiosity: inter-cohort declines are sharp in both early 
and late secularizing societies, but the return to religiosity across the life cycle appears to 
be considerably stronger among those in early secularizing countries to the extent that 
life-cycle effects broadly counterbalance cohort effects.  
It would appear that in the ten west European societies we have examined, levels 
of religiosity appear to be approaching a baseline of around 5 percent church attendance 
40-50 percent private religiosity. Moreover, it is worth noting that while individual 
religiosity stands as one of the strongest of all religious indicators on the EVS, it is 
exceeded by some 10 points by belief in god. In the 2008 EVS, for example, 64.8 percent 
of respondents in these ten countries affirmed their belief in god though just 55.6 percent 
claimed to be a religious person. Assuming that trends in Catholic Europe come to 
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resemble those in the early-declining countries, we may well arrive at a future in which 
western European church attendance falls to very low levels even as society remains 
fairly evenly divided between the religious and non-religious. This would appear to 
corroborate Grace Davie's (1994) observation that many Europeans are 'believing without 
belonging', though an equivalent number seem, as David Voas and others have observed, 
to be neither belonging nor believing. 
 
Religiosity and Fertility 
 
 The patterns of religiosity detailed in the preceding analysis could have been 
produced by either demographic or social forces, but the swift pace of religious decline in 
the postwar period its distinctively age-graded profile incline us toward a sociological 
interpretation. The fact that the rate of religious decline has slowed in these west 
European societies may, however, offer an opening for demography to more significantly 
affect the religious composition of west Europe's population.  
 How might demography enter this picture? Second Demographic Transition 
theory postulates that as material factors fade and contraception becomes more readily 
available, values bulk larger as a determinant of family size. Accordingly, religious 
decline is associated with lower fertility (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). Several studies 
examine the link between religiosity and fertility in Europe and the United States, and 
most find a significant effect in at least some models. This holds whether religiosity is 
measured as belief, attendance or affiliation (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 110; Adsera 
2011; Berman, Iannacone and Ragusa 2005; Westoff and Frejka 2007, 2008; 
Berghammer, Philipov and Sobotka 2006; Regnier-Loillier 2008; Hackett 2008). The 
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fertility difference in terms of number of children ever born (among women aged 18 or 
over) between those who describe themselves as 'religious' and those who describe 
themselves as 'not religious' or 'atheist' averages between 50 and 60 points depending on 
the wave of the EVS or ESS we consider. In 2000, for example, adult females in the EVS 
who were religious bore 2.19 children over their lifetime as against 1.59 for the 
nonreligious.  
These numbers are somewhat skewed, however, since religious respondents tend 
to be older and are thereby more likely to come from more fertile cohorts and have 
completed their fertility than the nonreligious. But even when controlling for age, survey 
year, birth cohort, sex, education and income, table 1 shows that religious women in these 
ten countries still enjoy a significant fertility advantage over nonreligious women.9  This 
is very much in line with the existing literature.  
 
[Table 1 Here] 
 
A further finding in the literature is that women are less likely to leave organised 
religion (Hayes 1996). These data confirm that this holds as well for religious attitudes. 
The 1991 EVS (but no other waves) asked respondents, 'Were you brought up religiously 
at home?' Cross-tabulating this question with the 'are you a religious person' item yields a 
picture of the number who have left or entered religion since early adulthood. Women 
were less likely than men to leave, especially in the important 18-45 year-old 
childbearing age range.10  Mothers are more apt to influence their children's religious 
orientation than fathers (Lutz 1985; Blume, Ramsfel et al. 2006). Combined with higher 
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religious fertility, this gender influence may prove a source of religious growth in the 
future. Not all demographic indicators are favourable to religion, however: the 
nonreligious population is younger than the religious one, and hence more likely to have 
members in the childbearing age range from where endogenous growth springs. 
Furthermore, the relatively female skew of the actively religious population could 
redefine religion as a female pursuit, deterring male communicants.  
 
The Impact of Immigration 
 
 Fertility differences - especially the modest differences noted in table 1 - do 
manifest themselves in compositional change, but only over a long period of time. 
Arguably the most important near-term demographic driver of religious change is 
immigration. Ethnic minority respondents are undercounted in the EVS, as indicated by 
the 1.4 percent Muslim component of the 2008 survey, well below the 2010 estimate of 4 
percent Muslim for northern Europe and 6 percent for western Europe (Pew 2011). Our 
preceding discussion thereby presumes that the population of these ten countries remains 
largely unaffected by immigration. Clearly the opposite is true for the countries under 
consideration as all have below-replacement fertility and positive immigration.
11
  
 The 2004 ESS data for the ten countries under study had a more representative 
Muslim sample (3.2 percent), and these data show that younger Muslims are as religious 
as their elders. Trends across the full range of European countries sampled in the 2004 
ESS show the same pattern, which diverges from the trend of religious decline with age 
that one notices among most European Christians.12  These studies suffer from small 
Muslim sample sizes, but surveys which sample ethnic minorities and immigrants show 
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that most are more religious than their west European hosts (van Tubergen 2006). 
Moreover, studies of second generation ethnic Turks and Moroccans in Holland, Sweden, 
Belgium and Germany show relative stability of religiosity between the immigrant and 
European-born generations (Phalet and Haker 2004: 17-22; Phalet 2010) 
Affiliation data from three UK studies from of ethnic minorities in the 1994-2003 
period also reveal strong religious retention in the second generation (Berthoud et al. 
1997; Home Office 2003; Home Office and ONS 2005). This is true for Sikhs and 
Hindus, but especially true of Muslim ethnic groups like the Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, 
a finding confirmed for North Africans in a recent study of the Dutch case (van Tubergen 
2007). This tallies with widely reported trends such as the relative youth and vitality of 
Muslim congregations in Britain and the fact that weekly Mosque attendance now 
exceeds weekly attendance at Church of England services.13 Afro-Caribbean immigrants 
to the UK, many of whom adhere to Pentecostalist and other evangelical Protestant sects 
(Martin 2001), tend to be more religious than white Christians, though the second 
generation are far more likely to leave religion or intermarry with whites than their 
Muslim compatriots. Further work is needed to establish whether Christians of non-
European origin will follow the native pattern of religious decline or the non-Christian 
inclination to remain religious. 
 The religiosity and fertility of most immigrants, coupled with non-Christian 
religious retention in the second generation, will reshape the European religious 
landscape. Currently, Muslim and religiously unaffiliated Britons have a comparable age 
profile: 70 percent of Muslims and 64 percent of nonreligious Britons are under 35, as 
compared with just 39 percent of the country's Christians (UK Census 2001). As the 
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twenty-first century progresses, secular populations may begin to age due to low fertility 
and declining flows of native Christian apostates.  
 Meanwhile, Muslim demography and high religious retention will permit western 
European Muslims to retain their youthful age profile (Phalet 2010). Muslim fertility has 
certainly been falling across western Europe in most countries (Westoff and Frejka 
2007), as it has in the Muslim world. Yet there are several reasons to expect ongoing 
Muslim demographic expansion, including: 1) demographic momentum from today’s 
youthful age structures; 2) migration from higher-fertility, less developed regions of 
Muslim countries (i.e. southeastern Turkey); 3) fertility rates remaining well above 
replacement in source countries (thus far only western Turkey, Tunisia, Iran and Morocco 
approach European TFRs); and 4) groups retaining higher fertility when in the minority. 
(Goldscheider 1971; Pew 2011) 
  
Projections of Religious Change in Western Europe 
 
 It is possible to undertake cohort-component demographic projections of religious 
belief based on EVS data (models available upon request) but belief is arguably a less 
concrete category than affiliation (Skirbekk, Kaufmann and Goujon 2010). In addition, 
we cannot derive immigrants' and minorities' age structure data based on religious belief, 
so projections which integrate sociological switching, religious fertility and immigration 
are more difficult. However, it is possible to shed some light on what Europe's religious 
future may look like by using affiliation data, as this is asked on four west European 
censuses (Austria, Switzerland, Britain, Ireland) and contains sufficient sample sizes to 
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generalize about immigrants and minorities. Here we present findings for Austria and 
Switzerland as, unlike the other cases, it is possible to determine religion raised, and 
hence to adduce switching patterns.  
 We apply cohort component methodology to projecting affiliation in Austria and 
Switzerland as per the methodology and sources in (Goujon, Skirbekk et. al 2006; 
Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2007).
14
 Though not among the ten countries whose trends we 
analyzed above, the west European location of these two countries places them squarely 
within the purview of the trends examined in this paper.  
  
Projections 
 
 Our projections use the censuses to derive a total fertility rate for women of all 
major religious affiliations, including those who state that they have no religion (see table 
2). Note that even in these two low-fertility countries, the nonreligious have significantly 
fewer children than others while Muslim fertility rates, though modest, are well above the 
national average and over twice as high as the nonreligious rates.  
 
[table 2 here] 
 
We also build in immigration estimates drawing on immigrant source-country religious 
demography (from CIA World Fact Book), and incorporate Austrian and Swiss religious 
statistical yearbook data on religious switching for all 5-year age bands of each religion. 
A standard mortality schedule is used for all groups. 
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 Selected results from these integrated projections are presented in figure 5. We 
limit the scope to nonreligious and Muslim populations to spotlight the difference 
between the largely sociologically-driven increase of the nonreligious group and the 
demographically-driven rise of the Muslim population. Two projected nonreligious 
population scenarios are displayed, the ‘expected’ projection based on existing (fast) rates 
of net switching to nonreligion, and a ‘low decline’ projection which assumes that net 
rates of religious apostasy slow to zero by 2026-31 at which point the flows between 
religion and nonreligion are deemed to neutralize each other for the remainder of the 
projection period.  
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
Source: Dataset from Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2007. 
 
 A number of striking patterns emerge from this exercise. Notice that in both 
countries, curves of Muslim growth to 2050 are rising, while those of the nonreligious are 
convex. This indicates that the demographic forces propelling Muslim growth are more 
powerful in the long run than the sociological ones powering nonreligion. Indeed, even if 
rates of secular attraction can be maintained at current levels – which entails increasing 
Muslim apostasy quite substantially – the demographic disadvantage of nonreligion leads 
it toward declining growth rates, with a plateau soon after 2050 and eventual decline.  
 Muslim resistance to disaffiliation and the flattening rates of religious decline we 
encountered in early-declining countries lead us to expect apostasy rates to begin to slow 
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in Catholic (or significantly Catholic) European countries like Austria and Switzerland as 
their religious decline matures. Should this come to pass, the desecularization point is 
reached as early as 2021 in Austria and 2026 in Switzerland. Regardless of which 
scenario one assumes, the take-home point is that even with losses from switching, 
demographic forces can reverse religious decline.  
 This should give pause to both secularization and religious markets theorists. 
Anyone familiar with the rapid growth rates of pronatalist religious groups like the 
traditionalist Mennonites of northwestern Alberta (who have made their remote region 
one of the fastest growing in rural Canada) or ultra-Orthodox of Israel (who have 
increased from several percent in 1960 to a third of Jewish first graders today) can attest 
to the power of demography to rapidly alter the religious balance in a territory 
(Kaufmann 2010). In a more modest sense, non-European immigration and religious 
fertility can have a similar effect. In fact one could readily imagine an equilibrium in 
which religious decline among individuals coexists with religious stability or modest 
increase at the collective level in twenty-first century Europe (Kaufmann 2006). 
Any exercise in projection is partly dependent on its assumptions - though much 
less so than other social sciences given the demographic momentum locked into age 
structures. Some inputs are more predictable than others. For instance, given the existing 
literature, the results of the multivariate analysis in table 1, and the statistics on 
generational fertility patterns in the first four figures, it would be surprising if secular and 
religious fertility rates converge. 
Assuming that fertility differentials between the religious and non-religious in 
western Europe remain as they have for cohorts throughout the twentieth century, our 
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projections show how age and fertility structures can alter the direction of future religious 
change. Apostasy scenarios may vary more, but again, it is difficult to discern a return to 
higher rates of disaffiliation in the least religious countries of western Europe on the basis 
of a sustained post-1945 generational trend, sampled over a 30-year span. In short, an 
acceleration in religious apostasy rates appears as unlikely as a major religious revival. 
Should surveys show the religious population remaining stable in the early-declining 
countries in the next decade or two, longer-term religious growth will become 
increasingly likely.   
Immigration, both Muslim and Christian, may also vary, though it is worth 
mentioning that the general trend over the past two decades has been toward higher than 
predicted levels, recently bolstered by concerns about soaring dependency ratios in the 
context of aging and declining ethnic majority populations. Thus the recent Danish and 
Dutch immigration reductions run counter to the wider European trend of increased 
immigration exemplified by such countries as Britain, Germany, Spain or Italy. 
Moreover, one of the most important determinants of the size and composition of the 
immigration flow are the existing ethnoreligious networks in the host country, which 
intimate that Muslim flows will continue (Pedersen, Pytlikova et al. 2006). The most 
recent ethnic projections for northwestern Europe put the non-European origin population 
of these countries at 15-25 percent by 2050, with Muslims comprising perhaps 10-15 
percent of the total, up from 2-3 percent today (Coleman and Scherbov 2005; Coleman 
2006; Pew 2011).   
 
Conclusion 
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 This essay has tried to address some of the shortfalls in the current literature on 
religious decline in Europe which have been caused by an insufficient consideration of a) 
changes in the rate of religious change; and b) the demographic dynamics of religion. 
Most participants in this debate tend to frame their arguments in the form of either 
secularization or supply-side theory, both rooted in unidirectional sociologies of religion. 
Neither rates of change nor demographic forces are considered.  
 In the ten west European societies sampled, we find evidence of generational 
decline in both participation and belief. However, this is skewed by Catholic societies 
like Ireland and Spain, where religiosity is high and religious decline is proceeding 
rapidly. By contrast, in France and the mainly Protestant countries, religious decline took 
hold much earlier and the marginal propensity to leave among the religious remnant is 
lower than it was in decades past. These less religious northwestern European societies 
have reached a level of 'maturity' in their religious decline. Weekly religious attendance 
has troughed at around five percent of the total, but the proportion of the population 
expressing religious beliefs remains close to 50 percent, suggesting a 'believing without 
belonging' dynamic among a large segment of the population (Davie 1994).  
In the absence of sizeable shifts in a society's weltanschauung toward religiosity 
or secularism, the oft-neglected demographic dimension takes over. Differences in the 
age and sex structure of religious and secular base populations and secular-religious 
fertility differentials and sex ratios play a role, but exert an impact only in the very long 
run. By contrast, non-European immigration and religious retention – especially among 
Muslims - makes a strong and rapid impact. Set against these currents is the younger age 
structure of the nonreligious population stock and the relative youth of new religious 
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apostates. Those who leave at younger ages will not return to the pews, but many will 
return to belief.  
Demographic projections based on belief are difficult, but projections of 
affiliation - for countries where this is possible - provide a proxy, and they reveal that the 
demographic momentum of previous generations of religious decline will take three or 
four decades to pass. This will keep the religious share of the population on a gently 
declining trend for several decades. Thereafter, aggregate religious revival will begin to 
escalate unless people once again begin to leave religion at the rapid rates recorded 
during the mid-twentieth century. 
This is not the end of religious decline, which will continue with vigour in 
Catholic Europe, as it may in the United States (Hout and Fischer 2002). A more 
assertive European anti-clerical atheism combined with the demise of multiculturalism 
could raise the cost of remaining religious. Moreover, other trajectories are possible. 
Major geopolitical changes could ease tension between Muslims and other Europeans; 
liberalizing theological shifts could pave the way for an increase in the rate of Muslim 
apostasy. Immigration could become ethnically controlled, as in Japan or Singapore, due 
to a surge of ethnic nationalism, thereby slowing the demographic growth of religion. A 
new vogue for family life might narrow the fertility gap between the secular and the 
religious. These changes would set European religious decline back on its formerly 
robust course.  
However, in the absence of such changes, the steady-state outlook for western 
Europe by the mid twenty-first century is one of gradual, long-term reversal, probably 
around 2050. The dramatic impact of immigration and Muslim religious retention will 
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bring this process forward – even in Catholic countries – such that we may begin to see 
'de-secularization' in western Europe in the coming decades. Indeed, this is already 
visible in the continent's religiously-vibrant immigration cities. We acknowledge that 
further research, using alternative datasets and methodologies, is required to confirm 
where the balance in Europe lies between religious decline through switching and 
religious growth through population change. In particular, scholars should pay attention 
not only to the valence of religious change but to shifts in rates of religious change. 
The idea that religious decline among individuals can coexist with a modest rise 
in religiosity at the national level is a distinct possibility. All of which suggests that both 
altered rates of religious change and demography need to be more fully incorporated into 
the dominant secularization and religious markets paradigms. 
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1
 Mortality differences between the religious and secular are unlikely to play an important 
role as such differences, if they exist, would largely take effect beyond the reproductive 
age range. In addition, we cannot estimate mortality for religious groups based on 
existing data. Hence we use a standard mortality schedule as per Skirbekk et al. 2010. 
2
 See appendix 1 in www.sneps.net/RD/appendices.htm for further details. 
3
 Note that this figure excludes atheists, so does not exhaust the ‘nonreligious’ category, 
but data inconsistencies led us to prefer the WCD's 'agnosticism' measure over a 
combined measure. There is roughly one atheist for every six 'agnostics' in Europe, and 
this is fairly consistent across regions and years. 
4
 For an empirical evaluation of the WCD, see Hsu et. al 2008. 
5
 One exception is David Voas' as yet unpublished study based on the 1991, 1998 and 
2008 ISSP survey (Voas 2010). 
6
 The only exception to this trend is the earliest (pre-1915) cohort. 
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7
 Naturally respondents' interpretation of 'religious' may encompass spiritual beliefs that 
some sociologists would place outside the bounds of 'religion' but the fact that more 
people in the survey declare themselves believers in God than 'religious' gives us some 
assurance that respondents have a traditional notion of what religion is. 
8
 These figures are based on weekly attendance. Some claim that weekly attendance may 
not be as good an indicator as monthly attendance within the main European churches 
that are not congregationally organised, though the trends in this data hold for both 
monthly and weekly attendance. For a general critique of weekly attendance figures, see 
Hadaway et al. 1993. 
9
 See appendix 2 in www.sneps.net/RD/appendices.htm for coding details.  
10
 See appendix 3 in www.sneps.net/RD/appendices.htm for methodological details. 
Hayes (1996) also finds that women are significantly less likely to switch denomination, 
but did not note the prominence of women among converts from secularism. 
11
 France and Sweden have reached the replacement-level 2.1 period TFR in certain 
years, but this tends to form the higher end of a fluctuation which can dip as low as 1.75 
in other years. 
12
 Just over 400 Muslim respondents were captured in the 2004 ESS, of which 173 lived 
in the ten countries studied in this article. 
13
 See, for example, Gledhill, Ruth, 'Churchgoing on its knees as Christianity falls out of 
favour,' Times, May 8, 2008  
14
 Please see Goujon, Skirbekk et. al. 2006, 2007 for methodological details. 
